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This paper examines the impact of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on 
Malaysia’s economy as well as challenges and responses of the government in countering 
this crisis. It argues that the impact of the GFC is different from the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC). The AFC impacted the financial industry with the resultant collapse of 
Malaysia’s currency, while the GFC impacted the export sector with direct repercussions on 
Malaysia’s real economy. This paper explores the structural weaknesses of Malaysia’s 
economy exposed by the GFC. Given that Malaysia’s economic growth had become more 
trade-dependent after the AFC, domestic investments, including foreign direct investments, 
could only grow anemically. This had jeopardized long-term economic growth and 
productivity, which were crucial in offsetting the impact of the GFC. This paper shows that 
the expansionary policies implemented by the government to counter the GFC were lacking 
in meaningful structural changes and could not yield the desirable results. Lastly, it assesses 
the extent to which the New Economic Model proposed by the present government could spur 
economic growth in dealing with the GFC. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Asia is hit by another major crisis barely ten years after the devastating 
Asian financial crisis (AFC). This time, the crisis emanates from the United States. 
While no two crises are identical, they share some basic common conditions, among 
which are a build up of excess liquidity, from either domestic sources such as loose 
monetary policy, or external sources such as rapid capital inflow, that invariably 
lead to poor credit discipline, misallocation of capital, and the consequent rise and 
collapse of asset bubbles (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008, Thalassinos et al., 2010, 
and 2006a, 2006b).  They also exhibit quite similar financial practices, namely, 
excessive use of maturity mismatch (funding long-term assets with short-term funds) 
and unsustainable leverage, and the use of inappropriate and unregulated financial 
instruments. In the case of the AFC, the problem of maturity mismatch was 
aggravated by currency mismatch, i.e., borrowing in short-term foreign denominated 
loans to invest in long-term local currency assets. As a result the AFC was not only 
a banking crisis but also a currency crisis. As a consequence of this huge inflow of 
capital and double mismatch, many companies not only had high debt-to-equity 
ratios but also exposure to currency risks (Lau, 2005). A currency crisis was 
looming in Thailand when doubts were cast on the ability of borrowers to repay their 
loans. A massive outflow of portfolio capital coupled with speculative attacks on the 
Thai currency culminated in a currency crisis that led to a banking crisis. The Thai 
government, short of dollar reserves, allowed its currency, the baht, to depreciate in 
order to cut it loose from the dollar (Kamer, 2004).  The currency crisis soon spread 
to other Asian countries, including Malaysia. The Malaysian ringgit had depreciated 
by 40 percent against the US dollar and the stock market lost 80 percent between 
February 1997 and September 1998 (Tan, 2005). However, the AFC did not bring 
about the collapse of the financial and banking sectors in Malaysia with the 
exception of the tumbling of the stock market due to large outflow of portfolio 
investments by foreigners. 
In contrast to the 1997 AFC, the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) stems 
from the weaknesses of the U.S. financial industry that escalated into a severe 
international financial crisis and caused global recession by late 2008. The crisis is 
triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing asset bubble, in particular its subprime 
mortgages. The crisis that started in July 2007 was transmitted to the real economy 
as credit crunch and debt implosion led to job losses and a fall in consumer 
spending. The downturn effects of the US economy spread fast to other regions, 
especially export-driven countries like Malaysia, resulting in a crisis of exports with 
immediate impact on production and job losses.    
Malaysia was lucky in the sense that the GFC did not metamorphose into a 
currency or banking crisis due to the stronger macroeconomic fundamentals and 
financial systems built up after the painful experience of the AFC. But there were 
still structural weaknesses that made it difficult for the government to address the 
GFC. In the aftermath of the AFC, Malaysia’s economy had become more trade-
57 
The Policy Responses and Implications of the Global Financial Crisis on Asia: 
A Case Study for Malaysia 
 
dependent where net export became a major driver of economic growth. However, 
in times of external recession, an export-oriented economy will became extremely 
vulnerable to the decline in the demand for exports. This is particularly evident in 
the GFC. Also, as a result of a slanted orientation towards export-led economic 
growth, private domestic investment had been neglected. All in all, these structural 
weaknesses had affected long-term economic growth and productivity and in turn, 
the ability of the government to offset the adverse impact of the GFC.    
This paper examines the impact of the GFC on Malaysia’s economy as well 
as the effectiveness of countering measures undertaken by the government. It begins 
with a discussion on Malaysia’s economy in the aftermath of the AFC. It then looks 
at the subprime mortgage crisis which triggered the GFC. It goes on to identify the 
channels through which the GFC is transmitted to Malaysia’s real economy, namely, 
the trade and finance channels. It finally examines the effectiveness of the 
government’s expansionary policies and the New Economic Model in addressing the 
GFC.  
 
 
2.  Malaysia’s Economic Position after the Asian Financial Crisis 
 
Malaysia took proactive measures to address the AFC. As a response to the 
huge depreciation of the ringgit and the Malaysian stock market, the government 
implemented various financial and capital controls that included fixing the value of 
the ringgit at 3.8 to the US dollar, banning the circulation of the ringgit abroad, 
requiring official permission to remit more than 10,000 ringgit outside the country, 
and barring foreign investors from repatriating their investments in Malaysian 
stocks, bonds and properties for a year (Kamer, 2004). These measures were mainly 
aimed at containing the disruptive short-term speculative capital flows. They did not 
affect trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flow and the current account 
remained fully convertible (Yap, 2001). Meanwhile, the imposition of capital 
controls gave the economy ‘breathing space’ and the government took advantage of 
this to lower domestic interest rates and to pursue expansionary macroeconomic 
policies to stimulate economic recovery. The banking system was also strengthened 
through mergers and consolidation to create a resilient, efficient and competitive 
banking sector (Lau, 2005).      
Malaysia’s economic recovery from the AFC was dramatic. Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth had turned around from a low of -7.4 percent in 1998 to 6.1 
percent in 1999 and 8.9 percent in 2000. The speed of recovery was mainly driven 
by larger exports of electronics products, especially semiconductor products, which 
accounted for more than two-thirds of total manufacturing exports. In 1999, 
electronics exports amounted to almost 52 percent of Malaysia’s total exports. But 
the economic contribution of the electronics sector, of which 91 percent is owned by 
foreign firms through FDI, is erratic and subject to global cyclical demand. For 
instance, during the upturn in the global electronics cycle from 1999 to 2000, 
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Malaysia’s electronics exports rose to 52 percent of total exports. But during the 
downturn in 2001, adverse external circumstances affected Malaysia’s electronic 
exports which shrank 13 percent from 2000 to 2001 while GDP growth contracted 
from 8.9 percent to 0.3 percent over the same period.  
With strong performance of the electronics sector, inflow of FDI into 
Malaysia increased from RM10 billion in 1998 to RM14.8 billion in 1999. But FDI 
inflows declined to RM2 billion in 2001 due to the downturn in the global 
electronics cycle as well as increasing competition from China, India and Vietnam. 
Rising labor costs in Malaysia had resulted in the loss of competitive advantage for 
the production of lower value-added and labor-intensive products (Lee & Tham, 
2007). Although FDI inflow recovered and increased to RM17.5 billion in 2004, it 
fell again to RM15 billion in 2005. Thus, Malaysia’s economic growth from 2002 to 
2004 could well be attributed to the undervalued ringgit rather than an increase in 
FDI as the peg was maintained right up to July 2005 before reverting to a managed 
float system based on a basket of currencies (Lee & Tham, 2007). 
The main driver of growth in the demand components of Malaysia after the 
AFC was private consumption and net export in sharp contrast to private 
consumption and investments that featured prior to the AFC (Goh & Lim, 2009). 
Private investments were anemic after the AFC. Figure 1 shows that in the aftermath 
of the AFC, total investments declined from 40 percent to about 20 percent, led 
primarily by the fall in private investments which were halved while public 
investments stayed steady at around 11 percent.  
Figure 1. Private and Public Investment as percentage of GDP, 1990-2008 
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Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistics Bulletin 
Malaysia persistently records current account surplus during the post AFC 
period. In 2008, current account reached a surplus of 18 percent of GNP. However, 
Malaysia’s current account surplus, i.e. the excess of savings over investments, is 
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due more to a drastic decline in investments than a rise in savings as shown in 
Figure 2.  Gross national savings remained high during the post AFC period but 
were not used to finance domestic investments, a development that is not conducive 
to long-term growth in terms of productive capacity. From 2002 to 2007, Malaysia’s 
GDP grew at an average of 5.3 percent annually, compared to an average rate of 8.1 
percent from 1990 -1997. 
 
Figure 2. The Saving-Investment Gap, 1990-2008 
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Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistics Bulletin and authors own’s calculation 
There were two main reasons for the drastic drop in total investments: first, 
a decline in FDI inflows. While China and India experienced an unprecedented FDI 
boom after the AFC, inflow into Southeast Asia (including Malaysia) continued to 
shrink. The FDI inflows have moderated compared to pre-AFC periods. The average 
FDI inflows into Malaysia, which were US$5.2 billion between 1990 and 1997, 
declined to US$4.3 billion between 1998 and 2008. Second, a poor investment 
climate created by distortions and inefficiencies associated with the implementation 
of the New Economic Policy (NEP), bureaucratic red tape, shortage of skilled labor, 
and the brain drain problem contributed to low domestic investments (Goh & Lim, 
2009). Malaysia has more than 700 thousand of its citizens working abroad, of 
which two thirds are professionals.  
On the other hand, public investments funded through fiscal deficits have 
been a major source of investment in Malaysia after the AFC. Figure 1 shows that 
public investments had overtaken private investments from 2001 to 2004.  However, 
it should be noted that sustainable growth will only come with prudence in fiscal 
policy. Alarmingly, oil and gas presently account for about forty percent of 
Malaysia’s tax revenue. Given that reserve for oil and gas is depleting and could 
only last another ten years unless new fields are found (Narayan, 2008), the strong 
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reliance on these resources to fund public investments is certainly not a sustainable 
policy measures.  
 
 
3.  The Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
The origins of the current GFC lie with the US real estate market supported 
by subprime-mortgage lending. The real estate market was fuelled by the lowering 
of interest rate by the US Federal Reserve which had led to speculative lending. The 
lowering of interest rate was one of the measures to overcome a recession deepened 
by a banking and real estate crisis that began in the 1990s as a consequence of a 
combination of financial deregulation and deposit insurance in the previous decade 
(Akyuz, 2008). Between 2001 and 2003, for instance, the Federal Reserve slashed 
interest rates and held them at 1 percent for a year and then raised them in slow, 
predictable quarter-point steps. With low interest rates, financial institutions took on 
more debts, making investments more profitable and riskier. They also designed a 
myriad of complex derivatives, among which were collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDSs). By combining debt and derivatives, 
financial institutions created a new machine that could originate and distribute 
prodigious quantities of risk to a baffling array of counterparts. Despite warnings, 
the Federal Reserve refrained from using monetary instruments and regulatory 
authority to slow down the credit and asset bubbles.  
 
Many of these CDOs were held in off-balance-sheet vehicles that short 
funded themselves through the issuance of commercial papers. When investors 
suddenly stopped buying the commercial papers, the back-up credit lines provided 
by banks to these off balance vehicles abruptly came into force, causing a liquidity 
crisis to these banks. The subprime mortgage crisis finally led to a meltdown of the 
entire US financial market. Wall Street crumpled overnight. Sensing the danger of a 
collapse of the financial system, the US Congress and the Federal Reserve 
intervened to shore up the financial system by massive infusion of new equity into 
beleaguered banks. Other emergency measures were introduced: lending money 
directly to cash-strapped investment banks and brokers; accepting a broader array of 
collateral, including mortgage-backed and other investment-grade securities.  
 
 
4.  Impact of the Global Crisis on Malaysia’s Economy 
 
By late 2007, many financial institutions in the United States and other parts 
of the world suffered heavy losses from their CDOs, CDS and other financial assets. 
Fortunately, Malaysia’s financial institutions had negligible exposure to these toxic 
products. Furthermore, Malaysia’s financial institutions and banks were in stronger 
shape than they were during the AFC following better financial supervision and 
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regulation. The capital adequacy ratio has consistently been maintained at more than 
13 percent after 2001, which is higher than the 8 percent requirement by the Basel 
international standard for minimum capital adequacy ratios of banks. More 
importantly, the nonperforming loan as a percentage of total loans declined from 
11.5 percent to 2.6 percent in 2008, on the eve of GFC.  
But when the financial crisis spread to the real economy in the United States 
and Europe, the drastic decline in consumption in these countries led to a collapse in 
Asia’s export markets. Asian countries including Malaysia began to feel the adverse 
impact of the GFC towards the second half of 2008 and early 2009. Singapore was 
one of the first Asian countries hit by the GFC, followed by Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
South Korea and Thailand. Malaysia recorded a fall in real GDP by 6.2 percent yoy 
in the first quarter of 2009, the first time in negative territory since 2001. The 
contraction in growth has persisted into the second and third quarter of the year. 
IMF economists described this as an export-led recession (IMF Country Report, 
2009). 
The two major channels through which the GFC impacted Malaysia’s 
economy were the finance channel and trade channel (Goh & Lim, 2009).4 
After the economy began to recover in 1999, Malaysia’s capital controls 
were gradually relaxed and removed. There was a liberalization of capital account 
with increasing freedom given to both inflow and outflow of funds. Foreign 
participation in the Malaysian stock market has been more than 30 percent since 
2004 (Ooi, 2008). The economy on the eve of the GFC is more liberalized compared 
to 1997 (Khor, 2009). 
Driven by global deleveraging and repatriation of capital by foreign 
investors, portfolio investment in Malaysia turned negative after the second quarter 
of 2008 following a huge net outflow of RM84.37 billion in 2008. This was in sharp 
contrast to 2007 when the country registered a positive net inflow of RM18.35 
billion. This huge outflow in portfolio investment, mainly due to sale of shares in the 
stock market, was among the most severe in East Asia. Consequently, the Kuala 
Lumpur Composite index declined sharply by more than 30 percent between mid-
2008 and March 2009.  
Inflow of FDI into Malaysia declined 98 percent from RM15.89 billion in 
the second quarter to RM0.34 billion in the third quarter of 2008. On the other hand, 
outward direct investments by Malaysian corporations continued to grow—and FDI 
outflows have outstripped inflows since 2007.5 In 2008, outward direct investment 
rose to RM50.19 billion, and exceeded FDI inflow of RM24.13billion which 
resulted in a net direct investment outflow of RM26.06 billion.  
                                               
4 See also Khor, 2009 
5 Liberalization on capital outflows since 2005 has led to this result. Since 2005, private capital outflow 
became a major method for reducing the exchange rate pressures arising from capital inflows. Besides, 
investments abroad allowed domestic firms to expand abroad and become important players in world 
markets. 
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The surge in bank outflow in the second half of 2008 had a negative impact 
on other investments. Other investments recorded a lower net outflow of RM8.06 
billion in 2008 compared to a net outflow of RM46.9 billion a year earlier, due to 
lower net external debt repayment by both the official and private sectors (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2008).  
 
Table 1. Financial Account in the Malaysia Balance of Payment,  
2007 to 2nd quarter 2009 (RM Billion) 
 2007 2008 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 
Financial Account -37.71 -
118.50 
26.46 -11.09 -62.02 -71.83 -29.76 -24.19 
Direct Investment -9.14 -26.06 -5.15   0.17 -19.63  -1.45   3.19 -8.10 
  Abroad -38.22 -50.19 -8.91 -15.72 -19.97  -5.58   0.43 -8.96 
  In Malaysia  29.08   24.13  3.76  15.89   0.34   4.13   2.76   0.86 
Portfolio Investment 
(net) 
18.35 -84.37 26.08 -21.95 -55.28 -33.21  -12.15 -9.93 
Other Investment 
(net)* 
-46.92  -8.06  5.53  10.69 12.89 -37.17  -20.80 -6.16 
  Official Sector -5.79  0.85 -0.71   1.61 -2.74   2.70  -0.97 -0.65 
  Private Sector -41.14  -8.92  6.24   9.08 15.62 -39.87  -19.83 -5.52 
      Note: * this category covers financial transactions in trade credits, long and short term loan and other 
transactions that are not recorded under direct investment, portfolio investment, and reserve assets.  
      Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistics Bulletin  
 
However, Malaysia is coping with the huge outflow of capital from a 
position of strength compared to the AFC. It has ample foreign exchange reserves 
and a more resilient financial and banking system (IMF Country Report, 2009). 
Figure 3 shows Malaysia’s foreign exchange reserves stood at RM410 billion in 
June 2008 before it began to shrink beginning in the second half of 2008. As capital 
outflow intensified since September 2008, Malaysia’s foreign exchange reserves 
continued to slip till March 2009. As of October 2009, Malaysia’s foreign exchange 
reserves depreciated to RM334 billion, which constituted 9.9 months of its imports 
and 4.1 times of its short-term external debt. The ringgit has also depreciated against 
other major currencies from mid 2008 till early 2009. The real effective exchange 
rate (REER) has weakened by about 4.5 percent during this period, owing to 
nominal depreciation and a relatively higher domestic inflation.  
The impact of the GFC on Malaysia’s trade sector is more serious. Statistics 
shows that the most important factor contributing to its sluggish GDP growth in the 
last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 was the big slump in the export 
market, though low private investment was also another reason. Malaysia’s exports, 
highly dependent on electronics and semiconductors (contributing 40 percent of total 
export), started falling since October 2008. In January and May 2009, total exports 
fell by 27.9 percent and 29.7 percent y-o-y terms respectively – the biggest drop 
since 1981 as shown in Table 2.  
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Apart from the fall in manufactured exports, there was also a sudden drop in 
the demand and prices of Malaysia’s export commodities such as petroleum, palm 
oil, rubber and timber. These commodities account for one-third of Malaysia’s 
exports. Palm oil and palm oil-based products are the second largest export earners 
for Malaysia, contributing 9.6 percent of total exports in 2008. In May 2009, export 
of palm oil contracted 32 percent on yoy basis. Over the same period, the export of 
crude petroleum, which was the fourth largest export commodity, declined by 53 
percent yoy.  
The impact of the GFC on Malaysia’s exports was further aggravated by the 
fact that more than 40 percent of Malaysia’s exports were destined for the G3 
countries of the  United States, Japan and Europe which were heavily affected by the 
GFC. Hence, this time around, unlike the AFC, Malaysia could not export its way 
out of the recession since the demand from these countries for Malaysian exports 
fell.          
The crisis also affected the import of intermediate goods that are used in 
exports. Malaysia’s imports contracted 32 percent to RM29.5 billion in January 
2009. Since 70 percent of the country’s imports are in the form of intermediate 
goods, imports fell faster than exports so that Malaysia still maintained a small trade 
surplus as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. The Performance of the External Sector  
 Export Import Trade Balance 
 Y/Y M/M Y/Y M/M Y/Y M/M 
Sept,2008 15.0 4.5 11.4 1.2 28.48 16.9 
Oct, 2008 -2.6 -14.2 -5.3 -7.9 11.82 -34.8 
Nov,2008 -4.9 -3.1 -8.6 -8.1 10.71 19.8 
Dec,2008 -14.9 -11.0 -22.8 -14.3 22.59  0.3 
Jan,2009 -27.9 -16.9 -30.4 -12.7 -16.59 -29.7 
Feb,2009 -15.9 3.4 -27.3 -8.8 31.46 48.7 
Mac,2009 -15.6 10.1 -28.8 12.8 56.26  4.0 
April,2009 -26.3 -5.6 -22.4 8.7 -24.6 -41.1 
May,2009 -29.7 4.5 -27.8 -2.3 -35.3 35.6 
June,2009 -22.6 5.0 -20.8  9.3 -29.1 -9.0 
Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia, author own calculation 
The impact of the crisis on unemployment in Malaysia is not as alarming as 
compared to other countries or during the AFC. Malaysia had a tight labor market 
prior to the crisis. With an unemployment rate of about 3.5 percent, and the presence 
of almost 2 million of foreign workers,6 the impact of the crisis on employment 
opportunities for Malaysians was relatively moderate. The brunt of unemployment 
was mostly borne by the foreign workers. Figure 4 shows that during the depth of 
                                               
6 According to the news released by the Ministry of Human Resource, there is another 1 million of 
illegal foreign workers in Malaysia  
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the crisis in quarter one of 2009, the unemployment rate increased only to 4.0 
percent compared to 3.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008. According to a World 
Bank report, “Some 8 percent of the manufacturing workforce, more than 120,000 
workers, was shed with foreign workers taking a disproportionate hit. Job losses, 
shorter working hours and lower wages are likely to have raised absolute and 
relative poverty in urban areas” (World Bank, 2009). 
Figure 4. The Unemployment Rate, 2007q1-2009q2 
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 Source: The Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
 
 
5.  Policy Responses to the Economic Slowdown 
 
To counter the impact of the GFC on Malaysia’s economy, the government 
introduced economic stimulus packages to revive spending and stimulate domestic 
demand; at the same time, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) introduced an 
expansionary monetary policy by reducing interest rates.  
 
5.1. Expansionary Fiscal Policy 
On 4 November 2008, the Government announced the first economic 
stimulus package amounting to RM7 billion. The funds provided by the stimulus 
package would be allocated to projects that have high and immediate multiplier 
impacts on the economy. The government also set up an Investment Fund to attract 
more private sector investments. Several measures to directly boost domestic 
consumption were also introduced, such as a reduction of Employment Provident 
65 
The Policy Responses and Implications of the Global Financial Crisis on Asia: 
A Case Study for Malaysia 
 
Fund (EPF) contributions and a higher vehicle loan eligibility for government 
servants.  
In early 2009, with the global economic conditions putting economies all 
over the world in disarray, Malaysia’s economy faced the prospect of a deep 
recession. The RM7 billion stimulus package which accounted for approximately 1 
percent of Malaysia’s GDP was clearly too small to prevent Malaysia from slipping 
into a deep recession. The government on 10 March 2009 announced a bigger and 
more comprehensive second economic stimulus package of RM60 billion. The 
stimulus package was allocated for various purposes: fiscal injection (RM15 
billion),7 Guarantee Funds (RM25), equity investments (RM10 billion),8 RM7 
billion private finance initiative (PFI) and off-budget projects (RM7 billion) and tax 
incentives (RM3 billion). The RM60 billion stimulus package amounts to almost 9 
percent of the GDP. The introduction of such a large stimulus package is 
unprecedented. The package will be implemented over 2009 and 2010, and will 
involve spending on training, job creation, improving public infrastructure, school 
facilities and basic amenities as well as establishing guarantee facilities. Two loan 
guarantee facilities, namely, the Working Capital Guarantee Scheme and Industry 
Restructuring Loan Guarantee Scheme were established to provide working capital 
and to encourage investments by businesses. In addition, the Financial Guarantee 
Institution will also be established to provide credit enhancement to companies that 
raise funds from the bond market.  
The total allocation of the first and second economic stimulus packages 
(RM67 billion) amounted to 10 percent of the GDP of the economy. This is the 5th 
largest economic stimulus package in East Asia, after China, Japan, South Korea 
and Singapore.  
This will increase the Federal Government’s budget deficit from 4.8 percent 
in 2008 to 7.6 percent in 2009 (BNM, 2008).  Figure 5 shows Malaysia has never 
gotten out of its fiscal deficit since the AFC. The economy has experienced 11 years 
of fiscal deficit. Although fiscal deficit eased in the mid 2000s, it widened again in 
the late 2000s. As the saying goes, the government has to spend when times are 
good and has to spend even more when times are bad.  Malaysia has a very narrow 
tax base, 40 percent of the government tax revenue is derived from the oil and gas 
sector (Ariff, 2009). A large amount of the fiscal deficit was financed from domestic 
sources, given the ample liquidity in the domestic financial system arising from 
forced private savings, and are directed at the purchase of government securities 
through institutions such as public pension funds, banks or public enterprise.  
 
 
                                               
7  This amount is drawn from the government’s coffers where RM10 billion is allocated for 
development and RM5billion is allocated for operating costs 
8  This amount of money is given to Khazanah National to acquire equity stakes in local projects with 
high multiplier effects.  
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Figure 5: Malaysia’s fiscal position, 1995-2008  
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Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistics Bulletin 
 
5.2. Expansionary Monetary Policy 
With the slowing down of inflation,9 Malaysia has more room to pursue 
expansionary monetary policy to support domestic economy. BNM has reduced the 
Overnight Policy Rate (OPR) three times by a total of 150 basis points between 
November 2008 and February 2009. The OPR is currently maintained at 2 percent. 
Meanwhile, the Statutory Reserve Requirement (SRR) has been reduced by 200 
basis points to 1.0 percent.10   
The key to economic recovery now lies with the government’s economic 
intervention. Although it may not be the best economic policy, it is the only way to 
get out of the crisis. There are concerns as to whether expansionary policies will 
yield the right economic push and multiplier effects needed to cope with the 
recession. One criticism is that both economic stimulus packages have been 
disbursed mostly to infrastructure or construction projects which employ a 
substantial number of foreign workers and remittance made by them creates 
leakages in the domestic economy. Data showed that the total recorded remittance 
outflows from Malaysia in 2006 amounted to 3.7 percent of the GDP (Quah, 2009a). 
Furthermore, like Japan, Malaysia has a huge number of contractors, numbering 
67,000. These contractors, mostly Bumiputeras, form a formidable support base for 
                                               
9 Inflation has been decelerated from 8.5 percent in August 2008 to 3.5 percent in March 2009 
10 Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, 2008, p.99 and Monetary Policy Statement, announced by 
Bank Negara on 24 February,2009 
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UMNO.11 The awarding of contracts is made more for political rather than economic 
reasons.  
 
 
6.  Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
The GFC has affected Malaysia in ways that are slightly different from the 
AFC. The AFC was truly a currency and financial crisis. The rapid and huge inflow 
of foreign capital into Southeast Asia led to current account deficits, massive 
misallocation and wastage of capital, risky financial practices like excessive 
leverage compounded by currency and maturity mismatches of assets and liabilities. 
Additionally, the pegged currency regimes allowed investors and speculators to 
exploit arbitrage opportunities. All these eventually led to the collapse of the 
currencies, and the financial industry and the economies. In contrast, the GFC, as it 
affected Asia, was neither a currency crisis nor a financial crisis. It is essentially an 
export crisis, mainly of manufactured products directed at G3 countries, with direct 
impacts on the real economy.   
The shocks of this crisis are transmitted through the financial and trade 
sectors. In the financial sector, Malaysia became even more integrated into the 
global financial system and the big impact was felt primarily in the stock markets 
with rapid outflow of portfolio investments sending the stock market down by over 
50 percent. Fortunately, the fall-out to other parts of the financial sector was limited 
as the banking sector was better supervised, sound and healthy and there was no 
huge build up of a property asset bubble. Also Malaysian banks had limited 
exposure to toxic financial assets having learned their lessons in the AFC. 
However, the GFC has a huge impact on Malaysia’s trade. Malaysia has 
always relied on exports to stimulate its economic growth, more so after the AFC. 
Declining external demand in the aftermath of the GFC has adversely affected 
Malaysia’s foreign trade. Malaysia registered a drop of 27 percent in exports in 
January 2009, the biggest drop in exports since 1982. This brings to fore the 
question on whether without external trade from the G3 countries, the economy of 
Malaysia in particular, and East Asian countries in general, can sustain their growth 
through domestic and intra-regional consumption and investments. 
The GFC has exposed critical structural flaws in Malaysia’s economy. 
Alarmingly, the current account surplus in Malaysia after the AFC, is not due to a 
significant increase in total savings but rather a drastic drop in total private 
investments. Many factors have contributed to the drastic drop in total private 
investments, among which are poor and biased implementation of the NEP, 
bureaucratic red tape, declining standards of education, severe shortage of skilled 
labor and serious brain drains. All these have reduced Malaysia’s competitive edge 
                                               
11 UMNO is Malaysia’s largest political party and a founding member of the Barisan National 
coalition. It has played a dominant role in Malaysian politics since independence  
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in the global economy and hence its failure to make a quick recovery from the GFC. 
Malaysia is now stuck in the middle-income trap. On the one hand, it does not have 
the cost advantage as a low-cost producer to challenge countries like Vietnam, 
Indonesia and Thailand. On the other hand, it is struggling to become a high-end 
producer but lacks the required technological advancement (World Bank, 2009). 
Malaysia’s fiscal deficit since the AFC is yet another problem that reflects 
its structural flaws and its inability to counter the GFC. As previously mentioned, 
public investments funded through fiscal deficits have been a major source of 
investments in Malaysia, even overtaking private investments in 2002. Forty percent 
of tax revenue is derived from oil and gas. The over-dependence on non-renewable 
natural resources to spur public investments should be a short-term and not a long-
term fiscal policy, as Malaysia’s oil and gas reserves are estimated to be depleted in 
another decade or so. Thus the government should adopt long-term fiscal measures 
to strengthen its vulnerable fiscal system. 
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the massive fiscal stimulus packages 
(amounting to 10 percent of Malaysia’s GDP) introduced by the government to 
counter the impact of the GFC remains in doubt. This is primarily because the 
stimulus packages failed to address the critical structural flaws mentioned earlier. 
Instead of stimulating private spending, the stimulus packages substituted private 
spending with public spending. In Malaysia, public spending is fraught with 
leakages in the implementation process leading to higher fiscal deficits. However, 
there are new measures undertaken by the government under the new Prime 
Minister, Najib, to spur economic growth and to reach a high-income country by 
2020, a target set in 1991 under the premiership of Dr Mahathir. The new 
government has lifted some restrictions imposed by the NEP. In particular, it 
revoked the thirty percent bumiputra equity requirement12 for firms seeking to list on 
the stock market. This has freed investors from the compulsion to seek bumiputra 
partners who, more often than not, are sleeping or rent-seeking partners. The 
Foregin Investment Committee’s guidelines on acquisition of equity stakes, mergers 
and acquisitions have also been repealed.  
The government has recently come out with the New Economic Model that 
aims to transform Malaysia from middle income to a high income country. One of 
its focuses is to build up the service sector as the main engine of growth and to bring 
its contribution to more than 60 percent of GDP by 2020 from the current 55 percent 
(MITI, 2009). To meet this goal, it has further liberalized 27 sub sectors in the 
service industry to promote competitiveness, upgrading of technology and skills, and 
export of services. Some of these 27 sub sectors are tourism, health, education, 
computer and IT services, transport, finance and insurance, construction, business 
and professional services etc.  While there is a need to diversify the sources of 
                                               
12 The NEP, formulated in 1971, targeted a thirty percent share of the economy for the Bumiputra, as 
part of the socio-economic restructuring affirmative action launched by the then Prime Minister Tun 
Abdul Razak. 
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growth, it is necessary to focus on areas where one has competitive advantage, and 
also to be selective in the adoption of policies and practices. For example, an 
uncritical liberalization of the financial sector can cause more harm than good as is 
evident in this financial crisis.  
A third pillar of the government’s liberalization effort is the privatization of 
its government-linked corporations (GLCs) that are associated with the bumiputra 
equity policies. The government through its investment arm, Khazanah Nasional 
Bhd, owns substantial equity holdings in many publicly listed companies. The 
government attempts to divest part of its holdings to diversify and attract more 
public ownership. But many people are concerned that this attempt may repeat 
similar malpractices of the government when it privatized its public enterprises 
beginning in the 1990s. This privatizing exercise not only led to cronyism but also 
huge financial losses involving the sale and later repurchase of shares in debt-ridden 
privatized companies, such as  the Malaysian Airline System, the national airlines 
(Tan, 2008).  
Finally, the government is aiming to increase domestic consumption as an 
engine of growth. Mohamad Nor Yakcop, the Second Minister of Finance of 
Malaysia, in a recent interview with CNBC said he would like to see consumption in 
Malaysia increase from 51 percent of GDP to 70 percent. This ratio will put it on par 
with the U.S. consumption level as a proportion of its GDP. One of the structural 
causes of the financial crisis is the increasing imbalance in wealth and income 
distribution contributing to increase in household debt as a way to sustain a high 
level of consumption (Tan, 2008). Malaysia’s Gini coefficient is 49, slightly higher 
than that of the United States and the second worst in Asia (Lim, 2005). The 
country’s total bank loans are skewed to private consumption with 55 percent 
directed to households in the form of residential and non-residential property loans 
(36 percent), passenger car loans (10 percent), credit cards and personal loans (7 
percent). Without increasing household income or improving its income and wealth 
distribution profile, pumping up consumption through debt creation could take it 
down the same path as the United States. In fact, this is a policy challenge for most 
Asian countries, particularly China, that are attempting to turn to domestic 
consumption as an engine of growth. 
Most of the components of the new economic model of the government, 
such as focusing on innovation and a knowledge-based economy, consumption 
growth, increasing productivity etc. are, in fact, not new (Quah, 2009b). They have 
been suggested in one form or another under the Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001-2005) 
and the earlier Master Industrial Plans. The big challenge is whether the present 
government, burdened with a political base that has benefited so much from rent-
seeking activities for decades, has enough political will to carry through any 
meaningful structural changes and removal of the barriers identified earlier. This 
remains the most crucial issue facing Malaysia as it tries to escape from its middle-
income status trap to move up to the next level in the income ladder.  
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